The big story in the NFL this week was Javon Walker being found beaten and unconscious following a night of partying in Las Vegas. http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3448362
I remember the day I met Javon and how impressed I was with him. It was a Sunday morning; the second day of the 2002 NFL Draft. On the previous day the Packers had traded a second round pick to move from the 28th to the 20th pick to select Javon as our first-round selection. Minutes after making the pick, at least three teams called that were directly behind us and told us we had taken their guy.
Javon flew in right away to meet the staff and the media, a customary routine for first-round picks. We were having breakfast the next morning, preparing for the selections ahead in rounds 4-7 when he walked in. He was tall, strapping, handsome and innocent as a kindergartener. He addressed everyone “Yes, sir” or “No, sir” and had a disarming yet glowing smile.
Our head coach and general manager, Mike Sherman, looked Javon in the eye that morning and said that he hoped for one thing in Javon’s career – that he would not change. Javon, of course, assured Mike that he would not.
Wishful thinking.
Javon, as we now know, became a wonderful player for the Packers, slowly separating himself from our other receivers in terms of strength, speed and ability to separate. And in his first couple of years on the team, he appeared to be that shy, innocent and just-happy-to-be-here kid we drafted. Soon enough, however, things would change.
Following the 2004 season and Javon's selection to Pro Bowl, with whispers was in his ear about how good he had become relative to other receivers in football, he fired his previous agent and hired Drew Rosenhaus, who proceeded to send an offer that would have made Javon the highest paid receiver in the NFL. We declined but discussed that we would address the contract at some point during the 2005 season. (A lot is made of Drew, but I always found him pleasant to deal with; you just have to be aware that, in many cases, he is playing to the media).
Javon tore his knee in the first game of the 2005 season against the Lions, which turned out to be the end of his time in Green Bay (he had his surgery and did his rehab in Houston). He then once again changed agents, from Drew to Kennard McGuire, but the message became louder that he wanted out. As to why, we never really were given a clear answer. There were comments about being offended by Brett Favre speaking out against Javon’s contract demands, conflicts with other teammates, being disrespected by a hotel clerk in Milwaukee, etc. It did not matter. He wanted out in no uncertain terms, as Kennard expressed to me at the NFL Combine in February 2006 and Javon expressed to anyone who would listen soon thereafter.
These situations are never easy for a team, as we knew his teammates were watching as to whether we would accede to his trade wishes. In this case, however, things were made easier due to the extent of surgery and long-term prognosis of his knee. Thus, on the first day of the 2006 NFL draft, precisely four years from the day we selected him, we traded him to the Broncos for a high second-round pick (which we subsequently traded and ended up taking Greg Jennings later that round).
As the years went by with Javon, I noticed some changes. He took the two-hour drive to hang out in Milwaukee a lot -- hardly unusual for Packer players, yet his excursions were more frequent than most. And, of course, when time allowed, he went to Vegas. Also, the people that started hanging around him appeared to be a more fast-track crew than his usual post-game crew that was primarily family.
I also remember a curious call from a guy in New Jersey to let us know he had dragged Javon out of the water in Cancun where he was “pretty bloodied up” after a jet skiing accident. Although this was a strange call, the guy sounded legit so I called Kennard and found out that yes, Javon went to the hospital after falling out of a jet ski, though severity of the injury was downplayed. By now, however, the rumor mill about Javon's off-the-field life were hard to ignore.
I saw Javon last year when we played the Broncos in a Monday night game and we had a nice long visit. He was, unfortunately, in the same status when I saw him last with the Packers – in a sweat suit not playing due to a knee injury. He ironically said he missed Green Bay and later I even heard he wanted to come back and play for the Packers (which he considered this year before being offered 12M in guaranteed money from the Raiders).
I feel for Javon and his injuries in Las Vegas this week, although he is fortunate to apparently be all right. I am not shocked, however, that he put himself in a position for this to happen. Obviously, my heart bleeds for Javon to have witnessed the death of a close friend a year ago. Mostly, however, I feel sorry for Javon that there does not appear to be a driving moral compass in his life and there should be; he is too good a person for there not to be a person or persons guiding him. There is nothing wrong with a young wealthy single guy enjoying this time in life, but this was not the polite, shy and respectful young man that walked into our building on draft weekend in 2002.
Friday, June 20, 2008
Tuesday, June 3, 2008
Recent Column in Sports Business Journal
Numbers at the top blow rookie pay issue out of proportion
Published June 02, 2008
This time every year, the outcry about NFL rookies’ pay emanates: How can players who have not played a snap in the NFL make more than proven veterans?
That argument makes perfect sense, although it is fallacious. Compensation to rookies is doing exactly what it is intended to do: moving money to veterans.
Consider the following: The average NFL player earns approximately $1.7 million. Of the 252 players who are part of the 2008 rookie class, approximately 225 of them will average less than that.
This hardly appears to be a major problem. The misperception about rookie salaries is largely due to the top of the draft.
When the Miami Dolphins came to terms with the No. 1 overall pick, Jake Long, the media and industry focus was less on Long’s signing his contract three months before his first padded practice and more about the terms of the contract. The headlines blared: five years, $57 million with $30 million guaranteed!
A couple of weeks later, even more stark numbers were announced with the Atlanta Falcons’ signing of the No. 3 overall pick, Matt Ryan: six years, $72 million with $34.75 million guaranteed!
With those attention-grabbing numbers, the debate began anew about rookie salaries, inequity to veterans, etc.
True numbers
The reality is that these are true numbers only if everything goes swimmingly with the player’s career. That is, if he plays injury-free, makes a Pro Bowl or two or three and has impressive statistical performance. Then, and only then, will he make the total contract numbers that were trumpeted upon the signing of his rookie contract.
And if the player is achieving that kind of performance early in the contract, he will certainly have an upgraded veteran contract in place of those later years, making it highly unlikely that the player will ever receive those rookie contract figures.
The guaranteed portion of the contract is largely received in the early years of the contract, lessening the long-term risk for the team. If these players — these extraordinarily valuable top draft pick currencies — cannot make the team in their first few years, guaranteed money is hardly the teams’ biggest concern.
The reality of compensation to NFL rookies is that it is disproportionately skewed toward the top overall picks, creating the perception of an inequity being foisted upon veterans.
Having usually dealt with picks late in the first round due to the success of the Green Bay Packers in each of the previous seasons, I had a rude awakening when we picked fifth in 2006 without the relative financial comfort of the late first round.
Although the player we selected, Ohio State linebacker A.J. Hawk, and his representative were a pleasure to work with and the contract was completed prior to training camp, the market for a pick that high in the draft was — and continues to be — a shock to the system, as the numbers radically escalate toward the top of the draft.
Rookie cap
The staggering numbers of the Long and Ryan contracts rekindled the debate of a rookie salary cap, although there has been a virtual one in place since the advent of the system in 1993. The NFL allocates an amount of cap room (the rookie pool) to a team to sign its rookies.
Contracts like QB Matt Ryan’s in Atlanta createthe perception of inequity toward veterans.
The NFL teams’ operation of this rookie cap has created the perception of a problem, as teams have allocated a highly disproportionate amount to their first pick and, to a lesser extent, their second pick, leaving the lower picks to divide what is left.
Approximately 55 percent of the teams’ rookie allocations have been spent on their first pick, leaving 45 percent of their cap to be divvied up among the rest, whether that group represents a few or many more players.
Why does this occur? The simple answer is that it does because it did last year, the year before, and so on.
When the CBA was last modified in March of 2006, there were some term limits put on rookie contracts. But any discussion of rookie compensation did not result in appreciable changes.
Those contracts, to conform to rules designed to limit cap room for rookies, are now reaching epic lengths of 50 pages and more.
Money paid to top picks has become so financially disproportionate that the pure football value of these selections has been diminished. No longer gemstones that teams would mortgage their futures to acquire, they may even soon see a day when a team trades a top pick and something else to move back in the draft, rather than vice versa.
NBA model
That is a concept familiar to the NBA, where teams trade players and rights to (retired) players and other valuable assets merely to purge themselves of such financial burdens.
Perhaps it is an NBA model that many desire for the NFL, setting cash limits per pick and taking negotiations out of the process. (Top NBA picks sign within days of being drafted.) This model makes sense and simplifies the process but would, of course, require collective bargaining.
Moreover, top NFL agents rely on these contracts — and the headline numbers — as badges of honor when recruiting the next class.
There is need for a change in the rookie compensation system, but not due to a misplaced focus on the very few. The vast majority of NFL rookies represent a fixed, efficient and reasonably compensated labor cost for the teams to offset the uncertain and expensive cost of the other method to upgrade talent: veteran free agency.
Long, Ryan and their cohorts perched atop the draft are the fortunate beneficiaries of a system skewed to their benefit. Most of their 2008 draft classmates will fall into the category of receiving what is left after the first picks get their share.
Perception about the chosen few has become false reality about the entire group.
Published June 02, 2008
This time every year, the outcry about NFL rookies’ pay emanates: How can players who have not played a snap in the NFL make more than proven veterans?
That argument makes perfect sense, although it is fallacious. Compensation to rookies is doing exactly what it is intended to do: moving money to veterans.
Consider the following: The average NFL player earns approximately $1.7 million. Of the 252 players who are part of the 2008 rookie class, approximately 225 of them will average less than that.
This hardly appears to be a major problem. The misperception about rookie salaries is largely due to the top of the draft.
When the Miami Dolphins came to terms with the No. 1 overall pick, Jake Long, the media and industry focus was less on Long’s signing his contract three months before his first padded practice and more about the terms of the contract. The headlines blared: five years, $57 million with $30 million guaranteed!
A couple of weeks later, even more stark numbers were announced with the Atlanta Falcons’ signing of the No. 3 overall pick, Matt Ryan: six years, $72 million with $34.75 million guaranteed!
With those attention-grabbing numbers, the debate began anew about rookie salaries, inequity to veterans, etc.
True numbers
The reality is that these are true numbers only if everything goes swimmingly with the player’s career. That is, if he plays injury-free, makes a Pro Bowl or two or three and has impressive statistical performance. Then, and only then, will he make the total contract numbers that were trumpeted upon the signing of his rookie contract.
And if the player is achieving that kind of performance early in the contract, he will certainly have an upgraded veteran contract in place of those later years, making it highly unlikely that the player will ever receive those rookie contract figures.
The guaranteed portion of the contract is largely received in the early years of the contract, lessening the long-term risk for the team. If these players — these extraordinarily valuable top draft pick currencies — cannot make the team in their first few years, guaranteed money is hardly the teams’ biggest concern.
The reality of compensation to NFL rookies is that it is disproportionately skewed toward the top overall picks, creating the perception of an inequity being foisted upon veterans.
Having usually dealt with picks late in the first round due to the success of the Green Bay Packers in each of the previous seasons, I had a rude awakening when we picked fifth in 2006 without the relative financial comfort of the late first round.
Although the player we selected, Ohio State linebacker A.J. Hawk, and his representative were a pleasure to work with and the contract was completed prior to training camp, the market for a pick that high in the draft was — and continues to be — a shock to the system, as the numbers radically escalate toward the top of the draft.
Rookie cap
The staggering numbers of the Long and Ryan contracts rekindled the debate of a rookie salary cap, although there has been a virtual one in place since the advent of the system in 1993. The NFL allocates an amount of cap room (the rookie pool) to a team to sign its rookies.
Contracts like QB Matt Ryan’s in Atlanta createthe perception of inequity toward veterans.
The NFL teams’ operation of this rookie cap has created the perception of a problem, as teams have allocated a highly disproportionate amount to their first pick and, to a lesser extent, their second pick, leaving the lower picks to divide what is left.
Approximately 55 percent of the teams’ rookie allocations have been spent on their first pick, leaving 45 percent of their cap to be divvied up among the rest, whether that group represents a few or many more players.
Why does this occur? The simple answer is that it does because it did last year, the year before, and so on.
When the CBA was last modified in March of 2006, there were some term limits put on rookie contracts. But any discussion of rookie compensation did not result in appreciable changes.
Those contracts, to conform to rules designed to limit cap room for rookies, are now reaching epic lengths of 50 pages and more.
Money paid to top picks has become so financially disproportionate that the pure football value of these selections has been diminished. No longer gemstones that teams would mortgage their futures to acquire, they may even soon see a day when a team trades a top pick and something else to move back in the draft, rather than vice versa.
NBA model
That is a concept familiar to the NBA, where teams trade players and rights to (retired) players and other valuable assets merely to purge themselves of such financial burdens.
Perhaps it is an NBA model that many desire for the NFL, setting cash limits per pick and taking negotiations out of the process. (Top NBA picks sign within days of being drafted.) This model makes sense and simplifies the process but would, of course, require collective bargaining.
Moreover, top NFL agents rely on these contracts — and the headline numbers — as badges of honor when recruiting the next class.
There is need for a change in the rookie compensation system, but not due to a misplaced focus on the very few. The vast majority of NFL rookies represent a fixed, efficient and reasonably compensated labor cost for the teams to offset the uncertain and expensive cost of the other method to upgrade talent: veteran free agency.
Long, Ryan and their cohorts perched atop the draft are the fortunate beneficiaries of a system skewed to their benefit. Most of their 2008 draft classmates will fall into the category of receiving what is left after the first picks get their share.
Perception about the chosen few has become false reality about the entire group.
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